The Two-Nation Theory: A Reality Beyond Borders
India’s state-sponsored interference in Bangladesh is rooted not merely in contemporary politics but in a long and carefully constructed historical design aimed at weakening Pakistan and reshaping the political destiny of the Muslim-majority eastern wing of the Sub Continent. The assassination of student leader Usman Hadi has brought this design into sharp and tragic focus. Hadi, a young and outspoken voice against foreign interference and ideological coercion, was gunned down in broad daylight after receiving repeated threats. According to local accounts, he had been under surveillance for weeks, warned to abandon his political activism, and ultimately silenced in a targeted attack that bore the hallmarks of professional execution rather than spontaneous violence. His killing sent shockwaves through Bangladeshi campuses and revived fears that dissenting voices are being eliminated to preserve a carefully managed political order.
To understand the significance of this crime, one must return to the origins of the Pakistan Movement. Bengal was not a peripheral participant; it was one of its intellectual and political centers. From A.K. Fazlul Huq’s historic presentation of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 to the overwhelming electoral mandate given by Bengali Muslims to the Muslim League in 1946, the demand for Pakistan was as much an eastern aspiration as a western one. The Two-Nation Theory was not imposed by geography; it was embraced as a civilizational truth that Muslims, irrespective of language or region, formed a distinct political community entitled to self-rule.
India never reconciled itself to this reality. From Pakistan’s inception, New Delhi pursued a policy aimed at containment and eventual dismemberment. The events culminating in 1971 did not arise in isolation. Indian intelligence networks cultivated separatist elements, provided training and arms, and orchestrated an international propaganda campaign portraying Pakistan as inherently oppressive. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in August 1971 provided diplomatic cover for open military intervention, transforming internal unrest into a full-scale regional war and leading to the secession of East Pakistan.
This intervention was later acknowledged by Indian leaders themselves, stripping away the veneer of humanitarianism often used to justify it. The political movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, though rooted in genuine grievances, was steadily aligned with Indian strategic objectives. In subsequent decades, this alignment hardened into a durable political axis. Under Sheikh Hasina Wajid’s leadership, Bangladesh’s governing structure developed an unusually close and deferential relationship with New Delhi. Both Hasina Wajid and Indian leaders, including Narendra Modi, have publicly referenced their coordinated roles surrounding 1971, implicitly admitting that the separation of East Pakistan was facilitated through a shared political and military design aimed squarely at Pakistan.
This alliance has had lasting consequences. Bangladesh’s sovereignty has often appeared conditional, shaped by agreements on transit, water sharing, and security cooperation that overwhelmingly favor India. Political dissent within Bangladesh, particularly voices critical of Indian influence or sympathetic to renewed ties with Pakistan, has frequently been marginalized. It is within this climate that the assassination of Usman Hadi must be understood. Hadi was not merely a student activist; he symbolized a growing segment of Bangladeshi youth demanding historical honesty, political independence, and resistance to Hindutva-driven regional dominance. His murder, following a pattern of alleged target killings, has been widely interpreted as a warning to others who challenge this imposed narrative.
Yet history has an inconvenient habit of resurfacing. The claim that 1971 buried the Two-Nation Theory does not withstand serious scrutiny. Pakistan and Bangladesh, despite political estrangement, continue to share religious bonds, cultural affinities, and a collective memory of resistance to Hindu majoritarian supremacy. Their separation was not a philosophical defeat but a rupture engineered through external manipulation. The enduring resonance of Muslim identity in Bangladesh today stands as living evidence that the foundational idea was never extinguished.
This reality explains India’s persistent anxiety. A Bangladesh that reclaims its historical narrative, asserts an independent foreign policy, and rebuilds relations with Pakistan undermines the carefully cultivated image of Indian benevolence. When Bangladesh questions interference or seeks balance, it is swiftly labeled unstable. Such labeling serves as pretext for further pressure, rather than genuine concern for democratic health.
Pakistan and Bangladesh are brothers born of the same struggle. Brotherhood is not annulled by borders, nor erased by the passage of time. Today, as India continues to rely on political engineering, media influence, and covert methods to keep its neighbors within a narrow strategic orbit, the people of Pakistan and Bangladesh increasingly recognize the value of solidarity. The natural affection between them is perceived as a threat precisely because it weakens divisive designs.
The blood of Usman Hadi has added a solemn chapter to this shared history. His assassination has not silenced debate; it has amplified it. It has reminded many in Bangladesh that sovereignty demands courage and that history demands truth. The Two-Nation Theory has survived war, propaganda, and political manipulation. With mutual respect and a shared resolve to resist Hindutva interference, Pakistan and Bangladesh can challenge narratives built on coercion and control, reaffirming that their destinies were never meant to be dictated by external conspiracies but shaped by the will and sacrifice of their people.
