The Illusive Israeli Strike on Pakistan
Israel’s history is an unending tale of invasions garbed in the name of security, once relevant against the Pan-Arab nationalist threat in the 1960s and 1970s. From Iraq in 1981 to Qatar in 2025, war has remained Israel’s default language of engagement. Israel proudly stands as the only country in the 21st century to faithfully execute Douhet’s idea of strategic bombing against innocent civilians. Nearly six times smaller than the province of Sindh, the Israeli arrogance has been nurtured by the unwavering U.S. support, shaped by neoconservative influence. Washington has vetoed UNSC resolutions approximately 89 times, many to shield Israel, including six recent Gaza ceasefire calls.
In 1998, Pakistan faced a serious Israeli threat to its nuclear installations. Through strategic messaging and visible force posturing by the Pakistan Air Force, it was successfully deterred. Today, even with Pakistan firmly established as a nuclear weapons state, one can contemplate scenarios that may fuel an Israeli response. Any indication of Pakistani nuclear proliferation would constitute an existential threat to Israel and trigger immediate red-line considerations. A secondary trigger would be Pakistan’s direct military support to Israel’s enemies, akin to Iran’s support in Yemen. An additional escalatory threshold could be the defence pact agreements with hostile states such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, under firm US influence, is not viewed as an adversary. Therefore, the Pak-Saudi defence pact is unlikely to provoke more than a calculated scrutiny in Israel. With this pact, unlike in 2015, Pakistan may find it difficult to abstain from responding to any intended or staged attack against Saudi Arabia from Yemeni soil. However, if Pakistan were to broaden this pact into a multilateral framework and deploy military assets, especially fighter aircraft in the region, it could place Pakistan as a potential operational opponent rather than a distant critic. In such a scenario, Israel may still prefer intelligence operations, cyberattacks, or sabotage activity rather than a direct military confrontation with Pakistan. Mossad/CIA, the same thing, should be presumed to have multiple moles in multiple important places to assist intelligence-based destabilising operations. After all, it had penetrated multiple ranks and files in Iran, a country considered to have a formidable homeland shield against covert threats.
When considering a hypothetical Israeli attack scenario against Pakistan, admittedly far-fetched at the moment, specific facts need to be considered. First, as a military confrontation between two nuclear states, both sides will be constrained in the scale of destruction and the duration of the conflict. Second, Israel would not like to confront PAF fighters in the air. Thus, the most plausible form of coercive military action could be a ballistic missile strike.
In any form of attack, Israel will have the covert/overt support of key allies, such as the US, UK, and possibly France. A US aircraft carrier will most likely position itself south of Gwadar, just as it did during the entire Afghan war, to provide multiple support options for such an attack. In case the attack is conducted by Israeli planes, they will face no resistance to overfly friendly Gulf countries, who will be informed about a ‘Friendly Flight’ in the nick of time, without disclosing its final destination. At best, Pakistan is likely to receive a valuable early warning through its friendly sources. Considering the boldness of Israel, the strike may even ingress from the Iranian side to give surprise, overflying insignificant areas, and bypassing Iranian missile defences.
Iranians are less likely to confront this strike with their inferior interceptor aircraft. Pakistan’s best response against such a strike would be to attrit them heavily in defence through the PL-15 and possibly the PL-17 missiles equipped interceptors, as well as ground-based missile systems. Depending on the nature of the attrition, it may follow up with a ballistic missile offensive in good numbers. The timing for developing such a capability should be carefully considered, but the groundwork should be in place. A tit-for-tat response by PAF fighters to travel nearly 3500 Km one-way will be highly complicated because the entire CENTCOM and its allied military assets will be pre-positioned to intercept such a strike. Pakistan’s nuclear posture would be limited to just signalling the readiness of its strategic forces. Exceeding that threshold would invite severe geopolitical repercussions for Pakistan. Therefore, it is best to reserve this capability for our long-term friend India. China is likely to provide Pakistan with significant military backing, but it will stop short of the direct, active engagement that characterises U.S. support for Israel.
Direct Israeli military action against Pakistan is highly improbable under current geopolitical conditions. Israel is not India, and one must respect its prowess. Cognizant of Pakistan’s military power, Israel is also unlikely to pursue reckless adventurism. Nevertheless, since the Pakistan Air Force is central to nearly every potential contingency, bolstering it against the changing dynamics of warfare remains a vital national security priority.
Developing a sizable missile force with higher terminal velocities, alongside layered missile defence shields against supersonic and hypersonic threats, to defend all prioritised national and strategic vulnerable points (VPs), should remain Pakistan’s strategic priority.
All such reinforcements require fiscal space. This is why Pakistan needs economic pacts more than military pacts. Both are mutually reinforcing instruments of national power. Without economic depth, military modernisation risks stagnation; without military strength, economic partnerships remain vulnerable to coercion. And the rider clause for economic growth is political stability and national cohesion.
