Beyond Unipolarity: China and BRICS Forge a New International Landscape
Following World War II, the U.S. emerged as the leading Western superpower, forging the global order through economic dominance, institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank, and a vast network of alliances and hundreds of military bases across various continents. The Cold War era remained bipolar due to Soviet counterbalancing. True unipolar hegemony began only after the Soviet collapse in 1991, enabling unprecedented U.S. dominance: global military projection, regime interventions, dollar primacy, control of sea lanes and airspace, hundreds of overseas bases, and decisive influence in international bodies.
In recent decades, China’s rise as an economic, technological, and military power, combined with Russia’s resurgence under Putin, has steadily eroded this unipolar order. The shift to multipolarity stems not from military defeat but from U.S. overextension – prolonged wars, mounting debt, domestic polarization, and peer competition – mirroring historical hegemonic declines like Britain’s.
Coercive U.S. policies—interventions, regime changes, and sanctions—have bred global resentment, portraying America as hypocritical and overbearing. This backlash intensified under Trump’s second term, with the December 2025 National Security Strategy harshly criticizing European allies on migration, endorsing far-right parties, opposing NATO expansion, and demanding 5% GDP defense spending. Such moves have fueled European suspicions of U.S. reliability, spurring talks of strategic autonomy and straining transatlantic ties.
In America’s traditional “backyard” – the Western Hemisphere – U.S. patronage is viewed with suspicion. President Trump’s provocative suggestion that Canada become the “51st state,” amid trade disputes and tariff threats, has triggered strong rejection and public backlash, further straining bilateral ties. Relations with Mexico have worsened. The administration’s toughened Cuba policy – reinstating strict sanctions, reversing Biden-era relaxations, and keeping the terrorism sponsor designation – isolates Havana while alienating regional partners seeking dialogue. In the wider Caribbean, U.S. strikes on vessels and unilateral security pacts are criticized as “gunboat diplomacy,” prioritizing American interests over stability.
Overall, these “America First” actions, meant to assert strength, are seen as bullying, hastening the erosion of U.S. influence and encouraging allies to diversify partnerships.
U.S.-led regime-change efforts in the Middle East, have frequently yielded prolonged instability, terrorism, and chaos. In Iraq (2003), overthrowing Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum that sparked sectarian violence and enabled ISIS’s rise, controlling vast territories by 2014. Libya’s 2011 NATO intervention toppled Gaddafi, resulting in factional warfare, state fragmentation, and the country remains divided. U.S. support for Syrian rebels prolonged a devastating civil war, leaving sectarian tensions and ISIS remnants even after Assad’s 2024 fall. In Yemen, U.S.-backed operations exacerbated conflict, empowering al-Qaeda and Houthis amid a severe humanitarian crisis. Afghanistan’s two-decade occupation ended in 2021 with the Taliban’s rapid return and strengthened extremists.
These interventions, lacking robust post-conflict planning and ignoring local dynamics, bred more terrorism than they suppressed, according to CSIS and the Costs of War Project. In contrast, genuine democracy typically arises indigenously through grassroots movements, as seen in Tunisia’s 2010–2011 Revolution, Czechoslovakia’s 1989 Velvet Revolution, and the Philippines’ 1986 People Power Revolution, avoiding the chaos of external imposition.
In Latin America—long considered the United States’ backyard and traditional sphere of influence—China’s expanding economic presence has provided countries with alternative partnerships, contributing to a gradual diversification away from exclusive reliance on U.S. trade, investment, and the dollar-dominated financial system.
A prominent example is Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves (approximately 303 billion barrels). Prolonged U.S. sanctions have dramatically reshaped its export markets: historically a major supplier to the U.S, Venezuela has redirected the bulk of its output to Asia. In 2025, China emerged as the dominant buyer, absorbing 70–85% of Venezuelan crude exports (often 600,000–750,000 bpd in monthly peaks), with India, Cuba, and others taking smaller shares.
U.S. oil imports, limited to authorized flows primarily through Chevron under restricted waivers, averaged around 100–150,000 bpd in late 2025 – representing roughly 15–20% of Venezuela’s total exports at times when waivers were active. Many U.S. refineries were indeed exclusively built decades ago to efficiently process Venezuela’s crude oil, making alternatives (e.g., from Canada, Mexico, or the Middle East) costlier or requiring modifications.
Intensified sanctions enforcement in 2025 – including secondary tariffs on nations importing Venezuelan oil and direct interdictions – further curtailed flows. Disruptions peaked in late 2025 with U.S. forces seizing multiple tankers carrying Venezuelan crude in international waters, prompting shipowners to cancel loadings, vessels to linger in Venezuelan waters, and exports to drop sharply in December. These actions, part of a broader pressure campaign, have challenged U.S. refiners.
This case highlights how coercive tools can inadvertently accelerate shifts in global energy flows, bolstering China’s role as a reliable buyer for U.S. sanctioned producers.
Mexico, the U.S.’s largest trading partner under the USMCA framework – in the backdrop of U.S. coercive policies – has seen surging Chinese engagement. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and project financing have grown rapidly – without political strings – reaching billions in sectors like automotive manufacturing, electric vehicles, and infrastructure. Trade has boomed, with bilateral currency swap agreements facilitating increased use of yuan and peso in settlements.
In the Andean region and Southern Cone: Chile and Argentina host major Chinese investments in lithium and critical minerals essential for batteries and renewables. Peru features the flagship Chancay megaport (developed by Cosco Shipping), inaugurated in late 2024 and positioned as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hub for redistributing goods across the region. Colombia joined the BRI in 2025, opening doors to infrastructure and digital projects. Nicaragua has deepened ties through free trade agreements and BRI participation, focusing on ports and energy.
Across these countries, China has emerged as a top trading partner for many (surpassing the U.S. in South America), with investments emphasizing mining, renewables, ports, and telecommunications under the BRI – ow encompassing over 20 Latin American nations.
This shift has coincided with broader discussions on de-dollarization. Several countries are exploring bilateral trade in local currencies (e.g., Argentina-China yuan swaps) and increasing gold reserves as a hedge (Venezuela holds the region’s largest at around 161 tons, followed by Brazil and Mexico). Within BRICS (including Brazil), talks of local currency settlement and even a gold-anchored “Unit” pilot in late 2025 reflect efforts to reduce vulnerability to U.S. financial leverage. These trends underscore a growing multipolarity, where China’s “no-strings” infrastructure and trade model offers appealing alternatives in a region seeking diversified options.
China: While the United States was busy expending vast resources on military occupations, drone strikes, and coercive measures, China adopted a markedly different strategy, focusing on rapid economic development, technological breakthroughs in 5G, AI, and renewables, steady military modernization, and a foreign policy rooted in non-interference and economic diplomacy. In stark contrast to perceptions of U.S. hegemonic ambitions, Beijing has consistently emphasized principles of non-interference in internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and shared prosperity, as embodied in its longstanding Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Through the BRI, launched in 2013 and encompassing around 150 countries by mid-2025, China has provided infrastructure financing, trade partnerships, and development aid without explicit political conditions – an approach that has strongly appealed to developing nations seeking alternatives to Western lending, which frequently imposes governance reforms. Investments span continents: flagship Asian projects like the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which advanced to Phase II in 2025 with extensions discussed for Afghanistan; surging Middle East engagements in renewables and resources (2024–2025); record African inflows for critical minerals, hydropower in Uganda and Tanzania, and industrial parks supporting jobs and green transitions; and Latin American ports, railways, and digital infrastructure via the Digital Silk Road.
Complementary frameworks, such as the Global Development Initiative and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, drove BRI engagements to unprecedented levels in the first half of 2025, exceeding $123 billion in investments and construction contracts. Notably, China has invested over $50 billion in African development projects. Rather than building an extensive overseas military presence, Beijing has prioritized commercial ports, railways, highways, and industrial zones to enhance trade connectivity. This “win-win” model has elevated China’s global influence through economic interdependence, establishing it as a preferred infrastructure partner in the Global South, despite criticisms regarding debt sustainability, environmental impacts, and potential strategic leverage.
On the diplomatic front, China has positioned itself as a neutral mediator, promoting dialogue and regional stability in areas where Western powers have often been viewed as partisan. Landmark achievements include brokering the 2023 Saudi-Iran reconciliation, which restored diplomatic ties and eased proxy conflicts like Yemen; hosting 2024 talks culminating in the Beijing Declaration, where 14 Palestinian groups agreed to interim unity governance for Gaza (though implementation remains challenging); facilitating Taliban-neighbor dialogues since 2022; and advocating restraint in 2025 crises involving the Red Sea, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran-Israel tensions. Proposals for a “new security architecture” in the Middle East, often under the Global Security Initiative, have resonated widely in the Global South, portraying China as a constructive, dialogue-oriented partner. By combining economic incentives with impartial hosting, Beijing has filled gaps left by Western mediation, significantly enhancing its soft power – even as outcomes hinge on parties’ commitment. This diplomatic activism seamlessly complements China’s economic outreach, distinctly differentiating its engagement model from coercive approaches and contributing to evolving perceptions of global leadership.
Russia: Under Vladimir Putin’s nearly three-decade leadership – accelerating markedly over the past decade – Russia has staged a significant resurgence, reemerging as a major military, economic, and diplomatic power despite severe Western sanctions and isolation attempts. This revival represents a deliberate pivot toward multipolarity, prioritizing sovereignty, alliances with the Global South, and resilience against unilateral coercion.
Key developments from 2015 to 2025 include military modernization and power projection: the 2015 Syria intervention preserved the Assad regime, showcased advanced capabilities like cruise missiles and airstrikes, and secured permanent bases at Tartus and Khmeimim, expanding Middle East influence; operations in Ukraine since 2022 spurred innovations in drone production, electronic warfare, and hypersonic weapons; and Arctic buildup with new bases, icebreakers, and Northern Fleet reinforcements asserted control over the climate-opening Northern Sea Route.
Economically, Russia adapted to post-2022 sanctions by shifting to a war-oriented model, achieving modest 2025 growth of around 1% (cumulative 9–10% over recent years, driven by 6–7% GDP defense spending). It redirected energy exports to Asia (primarily China and India), expanded local-currency trade (nearly 90% with China), developed parallel payment systems, and bolstered gold reserves, mitigating impacts through non-Western partnerships despite persistent inflation, labor shortages, and technological gaps.
Diplomatically, Moscow deepened multilateral ties via BRICS (hosting the 2024 Kazan Summit to advance de-dollarization) and the SCO, while forging stronger links in Africa (military and resource cooperation), Latin America (pacts with Venezuela and Nicaragua), and Asia. By mediating dialogues and challenging “neo-colonialism” narratives, Russia has positioned itself as a Global South champion, countering isolation.
This assertive, nationalism-fueled resurgence, built on pragmatic alliances, has allowed Russia to challenge unipolar dominance and foster a more contested global order, though domestic strains and battlefield costs underscore the high price of sustained confrontation.
ASEAN: Amid intensifying geopolitical tensions, ASEAN member states have steadfastly prioritized economic integration, sustainable development, and pragmatic diplomacy. Guided by ASEAN centrality, consensus-based decision-making, and strategic autonomy, the bloc has avoided entanglement in great-power rivalries, focusing instead on internal cohesion, inclusive growth, and diversified partnerships to preserve regional stability and prosperity.
This “multi-alignment” approach has allowed ASEAN to navigate challenges effectively. Under Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship, themed “Inclusivity and Sustainability,” the bloc launched the ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030 to deepen integration, boost competitiveness through digital transformation, green growth, and supply chain security, and upgraded trade agreements like ATIGA (ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement) while strengthening ties with partners such as the Gulf Cooperation Council. Negotiations for the groundbreaking ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) – the world’s first region-wide binding digital pact – reached substantial conclusion, paving the way for 2026 signing under the Philippines and potentially unlocking a $2 trillion digital economy by 2030.
On diplomacy and security, ASEAN mediated disputes like the Kuala Lumpur Accord for Thailand-Cambodia ceasefire and de-mining, welcomed Timor-Leste as a full member in October 2025, and persisted with slow-progress South China Sea Code of Conduct talks and the Myanmar Five-Point Consensus amid ongoing hurdles. Outward engagement deepened through summits with Canada, South Korea, and Australia, while maintaining strong links with China (ASEAN’s top trading partner) and the U.S., alongside rising trade with Russia and Chinese infrastructure funding – turning geopolitical pressures into growth opportunities.
Despite internal divergences and external strains, ASEAN’s projected 4.3% growth for 2025–2026, surpassing global averages, highlights its resilience. By favoring dialogue over confrontation, the bloc remains a stabilizing force in an increasingly multipolar world.
The BRICS bloc, originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has rapidly expanded into a major counterweight to the Western-dominated global order. As of early 2026, it includes 11 full members – the founding five plus Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (expansions phased in during 2024–2025) – with a new “partner country” tier adding 10 – 13 nations, such as Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, for deeper engagement without full membership.
Collectively, BRICS represents 46–47% of the world’s population (over 3.6 billion people), spans multiple continents, and unites key economic, military, and resource powers: China’s technological and manufacturing dominance, Russia’s energy exports, India’s demographic dividend, Brazil’s agricultural strength, and the oil wealth of new Middle Eastern members. In purchasing power parity terms, it accounts for 35–40% of global GDP, with growth projected to outpace the G7 in 2026.
This expansion highlights BRICS’ appeal as a Global South platform advocating multilateralism and reform of Western-centric institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Central initiatives include the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2015, which has approved $32–35 billion in loans for nearly 100 infrastructure and sustainable projects without political conditionalities, targeting 30% local-currency lending by 2026; and de-dollarization efforts, advancing local-currency trade via swaps, national systems, and the pilot BRICS Pay platform, reducing exposure to U.S. sanctions.
The 2024 Kazan Summit’s Declaration reaffirmed the Cross-Border Payments Initiative, promoting independent, inclusive settlement mechanisms to bypass dollar networks. By providing viable alternatives to conditional Western finance, BRICS challenges long-standing leverage over developing nations, prompting a key question: why accept austerity and interference when equitable options exist? These steps signal a gradual multipolar shift, amplifying emerging economies’ voices in trade, finance, and climate while building resilience against coercion – though internal differences on currency, alignments, and reform pace ensure progress remains incremental.
Conclusion: For years, prominent American scholars – John J. Mearsheimer, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Richard D. Wolff – have delivered unflinching warnings to successive U.S. administrations about the dangers of unrestrained hegemony pursued through military interventions, unilateral sanctions, and regime-change operations. Mearsheimer, through his realist lens, has long contended that the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” tempted Washington into a flawed strategy of hegemony, inevitably doomed, as rising powers like China and a resurgent Russia rebalance the world. Sachs has relentlessly critiqued American exceptionalism and neoconservative overreach, arguing that coercive policies – from protracted wars to economic coercion – have hastened the erosion of Western primacy while deeply alienating the Global South. Wolff, analyzing the imperial dynamics of capitalism, has portrayed America’s relative economic decline as a textbook symptom of imperial decay, where offshoring, soaring inequality, and elite denial burden ordinary citizens as power slips away.
These prescient critiques, often marginalized in mainstream policy debates, now stand strikingly vindicated. The rapid expansion of BRICS, China’s far-reaching economic and diplomatic initiatives, Russia’s enduring resilience, ASEAN’s deft multi-alignment, and Latin America’s accelerating diversification all point unmistakably to a more balanced, multipolar order. Far from mere containment or isolation, these shifts embody a profound collective demand for sovereignty, mutual benefit, and non-interference.
True multilateralism – grounded in international law, equitable cooperation, and respect for diverse systems – is not a concession but the surest path ahead. It promises shared prosperity, resolves conflicts through dialogue, and enables unified action against existential threats like climate change and inequality. By embracing it rather than clinging to unilateral dominance, the United States can adapt gracefully to this new reality, securing stability instead of hastening its own decline. The age of unipolar hegemony has ended; a cooperative multipolar world is not only inevitable but, if wisely steered, profoundly advantageous for humanity as a whole.
