The Illusive Russian Air Power
The dynamics of air power employment in the Russian-Ukraine conflict are most perplexing that have challenged the incisive assessments and predictions of so many airpower analysts. The trumpeted blaze of the fascinating multirole Su-57, the furious strategic bomber Tu-160, the mighty attack helicopter Ka-52, and the roaring Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missile seemed to have cooled if not frozen against a comparatively smaller, and relatively weaker adversary. If the significant airpower asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine could not conclude a conflict in over sixteen months, then many of the Douhet’s prophecies such as ‘Airpower alone could win wars’, which was nearly stamped in the Gulf War need a review.
Russian Air Force (VKS) enjoys an overwhelming edge in both quality and quantity. However, the ageing Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) is being energised through massive military support from NATO and the United States, including helicopters, UAVs, radars, surface-to-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, precision-guided munition, jammers, etc. In May 2023, the United States even hinted at allowing its European allies to provide Ukraine with F-16s in the coming months. According to the US Department of Defence website: “the Biden administration has committed more than $41.3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February 2022”. This support is huge and is for good reason. It is in the US interest to employ an indirect strategy and bleed its arch-rival Russia by supporting its enemy. At the same time, Ukraine’s allies, and especially NATO, are also cautiously gauging the impact of this support against the Russian mood, lest it touches the Russian threshold and triggers a wider catastrophic response.
So why could VKS not cripple UAF with such a massive edge? Why could it not destroy/degrade the Ukraine Air Defence through an aggressive and focused campaign, establish air supremacy, carry out significant eco-military degradation, turn Ukraine into a pliant state, and meet its politico-military objectives? Why a defined number of potent medium and long-range missile batteries (LOMADS and HIMADS) such as S-300 and BUK could not be negotiated with supersonic and hypersonic missiles and other advanced hard and soft kill techniques to operate with greater impunity outside the envelope of much-acclaimed short-range missiles such as Stinger supplied by the US? Why could Russia not create a kind of ‘No Interference Zone’ over the skies of a few defined ‘Zone of Interests’, if not the entire Ukraine, to effectively crush the ground resistance in support of its land forces? The Russians have every right to rebuke these questions as “easier said than done”. It is acknowledged here that VKS has some good achievements to its credit. It sufficiently degraded the UAF and considerably destroyed national infrastructure, including bridges, railway stations, airports, and power plants. It made a good contribution in support of separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine. But the general perception is that VKS’s success does not match the value of its possessed capability and perceived iconic image. That it failed to undertake bold and meaningful air campaigns, or concentrate force at well-contemplated ‘Centres of Gravity’ of Ukraine.
The airpower performance is less about skills and more about grand planning and strategy. There is a Japanese proverb that says: “Vision without action is a daydream – Action without vision is a nightmare.” Therefore, the VKS may have errored in one or a set of important planning factors such as grand air strategy, campaign planning, targeting philosophy, land-air integrated operations, etc. Airpower delivers the best results when it is employed as an independent strategic arm and not as subservient to the land force. However, observers believe that VKS has largely been employed in tactical ground support roles and that it could not be meaningfully employed to accrue higher strategic results. USAF Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula (Retired) believes that there is a difference between Russian and Western doctrines, whereby Russians employ airpower “as a means of an extension of ground forces”. Also, there were historical coordination issues between Russian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces. A prudent decision was made in 2015 to merge Russian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces into Russian Aerospace Forces under a unified Command. However, force mergers are always complex, and the resultant operational intricacies take time to settle. Doctrinally, it has been established that the air defence of a country, both by interceptor aircraft and missile systems, is one mission that must stay under an air force commander for many good operational reasons.
In the considered opinion of many analysts, the consolidated list of factors challenging the performance of the VKS in Ukraine includes the substantial military support by the US / West, the professionalism displayed by Ukraine’s Air Defence, the less aggressive Russian air strategy, the switching emphasis between counter-air campaign and the pre-dominant counter-land campaign of VKS, and the maintenance issues of Russian air fleet. The strength of the Russian economy vis-à-vis war stamina required for a prolonged conflict may be another factor that may have constrained a liberal and bold employment of Russian airpower. Russia would also be cognisant of preserving credible military deterrence against the West and not depleting its resources unnecessarily. Therefore, it could be a deliberate Russian strategy to keep its focus on the southern region of Donbas where it could wholeheartedly support its land operations, deny the Ukraine Air Force ‘liberty of action’ and avoid unnecessary deep incursions inside Ukraine.
Reportedly, a Ukraine military source has confirmed that “Russia has superiority over our air forces, but they are limited only to the territories that they occupy.” However, in this strategy, there is no immediate end-game in sight, and even if an end is to be found, it will not be durable and lasting.
