Multilateral Corridors (3Rs): The Pakistan, Caspian, Central Asian Nexus
The logistics landscape evolutionary process has transformed the economic geography of Euroasia and Central Asia. The key aspect of this transformation is the multilateral corridors linking Pakistan with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other “stans” of Central Asian countries, joining three Rs (routes of sea, rails, and roads). The multi-route system, comprising the Ashgabat Agreement (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman, and India in a pact facilitating Persian Gulf access), the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Corridor, and the Middle Corridor/Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) (linking China, Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey, Europe, with Baku at the center) serves as an entryway to the world market. The port of Baku, a part of the middle corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe also expected to be linked to Azerbaijan Railways as mentioned in early 2025 to facilitate maritime-rail connectivity. Additionally, China-Kazakhstan collaboration is in progress at Alat-Terminal to handle cargo volume load. For instance, the merging of TITR in 2024 container’s rail load increased by 2.3 million tons, and the seaport load increased to 6.3 million tons, aiming for the target of 10 million tons annually.
Pakistan is playing a critical role in establishing multi-model gateways utilizing Karachi port, Port Qasim, and Gwadar port. Including, the AD Ports group signed a memorandum of understanding in 2025 to improve the infrastructure of Karachi port and Port Qasim to open doors for Central Asian logistic corridors. Pakistan’s support for the Ashgabat Agreement and QTTA (land-transit agreement among Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) is increasing support to the Central Asian countries bypassing Afghanistan.
The collective strategic decision of Pak-AZAR on CPEC and the north-south corridor, Gwadar port, aims to link with the INSTC network. The agreement of Pak-Kazak on the Transit Trade Pact opens routes to QTTA and the Ashgabat network by offering accessibility to the ports of Pakistan. Uzbekistan is not a member of QTTA but plays an active role in the CASCA+ multi and middle corridor. Pak-Uzbek collaboration on the blue economy is aiming to link the Uzbek dry port with Karachi and Gwadar for a worth of USD 20 billion.
The key question is, how do these ports’ collaborations and connectivity benefit Pakistan’s economy and regions’ trade?
Due to political instability, Pakistan lags in expanding connectivity beyond CPEC. There is a dire need for strategic diversification and the opening of new routes to Central Asia and Europe. Importantly, Pakistan is cutting down its dependency on Afghanistan by facilitating transport trade cooperation between QTTA and the Ashgabat frameworks to ensure a stable trade flow. Pakistan is also focusing on regional trade cooperation on the Indian Ocean for the export and import of agriculture, minerals, and goods to and from Central Asian countries.
On the contrary, Pakistan can attract foreign investors by developing trust, ensuring political stability, and improving diplomatic relations with Europe. Ports of Pakistan have the potential to route Kazak oil refining or re-exporting by actively participating in a multilateral corridor. But the insecurity and instability in Afghanistan pose a threat to the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Corridor. Meanwhile, corridors linking Karachi, Gwadar, Baku, Aktau, and Tashkent are facing tensions and hindering the development of regional trade connectivity.
Caspian ports competition is yet another seal in the deal, hampering smooth cargo flow among Baku, Aktau, Kuryk, and Turkmenbashi ports. The Pak-India trade situation complicates the trade flow as India relies on INSTC through Iran and Azerbaijan, while Pakistan’s focus is on Gwadar, which has been politicized. Iran’s reliance on Chabahar port as a rival port of Gwadar leads to an un-unified strategy. TITR agreement is a threat to Russia as Russia’s trepidation of losing the north corridors and Ashgabat route may increase pressure on Central Asian states to trade on its terms and conditions.
Additional challenges are the bureaucratic inefficiencies, and objections like digitalization of the trade system, infrastructure limitations, freight charges, and India’s uncontrollable involvement in Central Asia, especially in Pakistan, are setbacks to the trade, region, connectivity, and regional economic stability.
