The Killing of Tamima Juhar
Norway Confronts the Shadows of Extremism – A Nation in Mourning
Norway woke up on Sunday, 24 August 2025 to a headline that seemed unthinkable: a young social welfare worker murdered during her night shift in a supported living facility in Oslo. The story quickly spread across VG, Dagbladet, Aftenposten, Filter Nyheter and international outlets. Soon her name was known Tamima Nibras Juhar, a 34-year-old Ethiopian-born Norwegian who had dedicated her life to supporting vulnerable youth.
The shock was not only about the loss of a promising young woman but also about the motivation behind the killing. This was not a random act of violence, police said but a politically motivated murder carried out by an 18-year-old man radicalised into far-right extremism.
Who Was Tamima Nibras Juhar?
Tamima’s life story is emblematic of the modern diverse Norway she called home. Born in Ethiopia and raised in Norway, she pursued her studies in development at OsloMet while working as a child and youth worker in a rehabilitation and welfare centre in Oslo’s Kampen district.
Friends describe her as empathetic, warm and dedicated to her work. She was known for her ability to connect with young people who had experienced trauma, instability and social exclusion. The flowers and candles placed outside her workplace after her death became a symbol of national grief with community members and strangers alike paying tribute to her life of service.
In many ways, Tamima represented the ideals of Norway’s welfare model: a society where every individual regardless of background has the right to care, support and dignity. That such a figure should be killed in her line of duty is to many a symbolic assault on those very values.
The Suspect: A Troubled Radicalisation
The accused 18-year-old Djordje Wilms was himself a resident of the Kampen facility. His arrest transformed the case from a local tragedy into a matter of national security. Initially charged with murder, prosecutors soon expanded the charges to include terrorism after he admitted during questioning that the attack was politically motivated.
Wilms’ background is still the subject of conflicting reports. Several newspapers have noted that he is not a Norwegian citizen with Aftenposten suggesting he is from Germany. Regardless of his nationality, he had lived in Norway for years and had been integrated into its social welfare system. His radicalisation therefore took place not on the margins of society but within its structures an unsettling reality.
A Digital Trail of Hate
Investigative reporting by Filter Nyheter uncovered Wilms’ presence in Telegram groups linked to far-right extremist circles specifically those associated with the former Norwegian political party Alliansen. In spring 2025, he reportedly engaged in conversations spreading antiimmigrant rhetoric echoing conspiracy theories about cultural decline and the so-called
“replacement” of native Europeans.
These findings place Wilms within a familiar pattern: the use of encrypted online platforms where young men are drawn into communities that validate and reinforce extremist views.
These groups provide a sense of belonging while amplifying grievances gradually transforming personal discontent into ideological commitment.
PST and the Missed Warning Signs
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) has admitted that it received a tip-off in
February 2024 about Wilms’ extremist views. At the time he was judged to pose a low-level threat. In hindsight this judgment has come under intense scrutiny. How could a young man flagged for extremism end up in a welfare institution without tighter monitoring?
This is not the first time PST has faced questions about its ability to predict and prevent loneactor terrorism. The balance between respecting civil liberties and intervening early against potential threats remains one of the most challenging dilemmas in modern democracies.
If we analyse radicalisation cases from a multidimensional perspective and as a totalisation, no one should underestimate abilities, skills and performance of Norwegian institutions such as PST (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste) and the police. They have a consistent record of dismantling attacks from extreme individuals, groups and third-party proxies while also countering international threats.
For instance, in 2010, Norwegian police arrested three men suspected of plotting a terrorist attack connected to al-Qaeda’s plans in Europe, a case highlighted by international media. In 2019, PST and police foiled a planned attack by a far-right extremist in Oslo seizing weapons and explosives before they could be used. In 2022, PST was credited with preventing followup attacks after the Oslo Pride shooting through rapid intelligence mapping and neutralising possible networks. These examples demonstrate that the institutions have played a decisive role in protecting society often under challenging and complex circumstances.
Therefore, our collective focus in Norway and indeed every country be to resolve the complex process of radicalisation that leads to extremism and terrorism. The blame does not fall on a single individual or institution (A, B, or C) but rather on the absence of a comprehensive knowledge bank and the lack of systematic approaches to understanding radicalisation complexity and comprehensive number of indicators. The main gap lies in the scientific mapping of attitude, behaviour, actions and exposures that define the radicalised mindset. Each indicator must be validated against the dynamic cognitive process of radicalisation to ensure originality and accuracy.
Existing research centres, such as C-REX at the University of Oslo have produced valuable academic work. Yet, too often, this research has limited operational value and is disconnected from frontline practice. Some publications would not even pass the standards of a rigorous scientific assessment if evaluated by true experts in the field.
This is why the proposal for a new National Counter-Radicalisation and Extremism Center in Kristiansand is so important. Such a centre must avoid repeating the orthodox patterns of producing theoretical papers with little relevance for practice. Instead, it should focus on knowledge-based methods, building a dynamic and validated knowledge bank that can directly support institutions, first-line practitioners and policy-makers. Once these gaps are filled, Norway will strengthen its already solid security framework, ensuring that interventions are proactive, relevant and scientifically grounded.
Echoes of Earlier Violence
The murder of Tamima Juhar is not an isolated event but part of a longer chain of ideologically driven violence in Norway like many other countries.
2001 – Benjamin Hermansen: The 15-year-old boy was stabbed to death in Oslo by two neoNazis in one of Norway’s most notorious racist murders. His killing sparked national protests and a reckoning with the presence of violent far-right groups.
2011 – Anders Behring Breivik: The worst terror attack in Norway’s history. Breivik detonated a bomb in central Oslo and massacred 69 people at the Labour Party’s youth camp on Utøya killing 77 in total. His manifesto and courtroom statements were steeped in far-right ideology, xenophobia and anti-Islamic conspiracy theories.
2019 – Philip Manshaus: Radicalised by online far-right propaganda, Manshaus killed his adopted stepsister Johanne Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen of Chinese origin before attacking the AlNoor mosque in Bærum. He was overpowered by worshippers before he could commit mass killings by former Pakistan Air force veteran.
2022 – Oslo Pride Shooting: In this case, the perpetrator, Zaniar Matapour was radicalised into Islamist extremism. He killed two people and wounded many more outside the London Pub in Oslo. Although a different ideology was at play, the mechanism of radicalisation and the devastating human cost was strikingly similar.
Each of these tragedies has raised urgent debates about how Norway identifies, monitors and rehabilitates individuals drawn to extremist worldviews.
The Symbolism of Killing a Social Worker
Unlike many previous victims of ideological violence in Norway political activists, minority groups or LGBTQ+ communities Tamima Juhar was killed in the role of caregiver. She was working in a rehabilitation centre, precisely the kind of environment designed to nurture those who struggle at society’s margins.
That she was murdered by someone in her care makes the attack both intimate and symbolic. It reveals the vulnerabilities faced by frontline welfare workers, many of whom work alone during night shifts. For Norway’s welfare state, the killing underscores the risks faced by the very individuals who embody its values of empathy and inclusion.
National Reflection and Debate
The killing has sparked heated discussions in political and civil society circles. Should security services intervene earlier when young people express extremist views? How can welfare institutions better protect their staff? What role should families, schools and communities play in counter-radicalisation?
For some, the case illustrates the limits of Norway’s open trust-based model of governance where interventions are minimal until a clear threat emerges. For others, it highlights the need for a holistic approach combining intelligence monitoring with community-led efforts at deradicalisation.
Beyond Security: The Challenge of Prevention
Experts warn that focusing solely on surveillance risks overlooking the root causes of radicalisation. Many young people who are drawn into extremist circles share experiences of alienation, identity struggles or personal trauma. Online networks then provide them with a simplistic narrative of blame and belonging.
Preventing future tragedies therefore requires not only better monitoring but also early education, psychological support, and community resilience-building. Ironically these are precisely the values that Tamima embodied in her work.
Tamima’s Legacy
The murder of Tamima Nibras Juhar is a human tragedy, a political crime and a national wakeup call. Her death connects Norway’s past traumas from Benjamin Hermansen to Utøya, from Bærum to Oslo Pride into a broader narrative about the enduring dangers of extremist ideologies.
She was not a politician nor a public figure. She was a social worker devoted to helping young people. In killing her, the perpetrator attacked not just a person but the very spirit of social care. As Norway mourns, the challenge is not only to bring justice for Tamima but also to honour her legacy by strengthening the systems of protection, prevention and compassion that she represented.
How Norway Can Prevent the Next Radicalised Murder
A Hard Lesson in Oslo
The killing of Tamima Nibras Juhar in Oslo was not just a personal tragedy but a national shock that has forced Norway to re-examine how it identifies and responds to radicalisation. Juhar, a 34-year-old child and youth worker was murdered while on duty at a supported living facility in Kampen allegedly by 18-year-old Djordje Wilms, a resident of the same centre. Within days, prosecutors expanded the charges to terrorism citing the suspect’s self-declared far-right ideological motivation.
This was not the first time Norway had seen extremist violence. From Breivik’s massacre in
2011 to the killing of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001 and from the Manshaus mosque attack in 2019 to the Oslo Pride shooting in 2022, the country has repeatedly witnessed how hateful ideologies can claim lives. But the death of a social welfare worker in her own workplace has brought the issue closer to the heart of Norway’s welfare system. It has also raised a painful question: why did the warning signs go unnoticed until it was too late?
When Early Indicators Go Unseen
Research on radicalisation including the detailed frameworks outlined in Radicalisation: A Theoretical and Practical Model shows that the first signs of danger are often subtle. They appear not as violent acts but as cognitive distortions: rigid black-and-white thinking, victim mentality paranoia or a refusal to accept alternative viewpoints. These small shifts in reasoning harden over time creating a mental environment in which extremist ideologies can take root. Yet frontline staff often focus only on behavioural outbursts withdrawal, secrecy or open hostility because these are visible and disruptive. By the time such behaviours emerge, the cognitive foundation has already been laid making intervention harder. In Juhar’s case, if the early hardening of thought patterns had been systematically tracked, the escalation to violence might have been intercepted.
Radicalisation as a Process, Not a Phase
One of the most persistent mistakes in counter-extremism is to treat radicalisation as a fixed sequence of phases as if individuals march steadily from “normal” to “terrorist.” In reality, radicalisation is better understood as a dynamic process, full of feedback loops, reversals and sudden accelerations. People drift in and out of extremist milieus, encounter triggering events or temporarily disengage before being pulled back in.
This process logic changes how early identification should work. Instead of static “risk scores” that freeze an individual at one point in time, authorities should adopt rolling assessments that track change over weeks and months. For example, a young resident’s online activity might intensify during political events or their engagement with supportive peers might collapse after a family conflict. Each moment represents either an entry point into danger or a potential exit opportunity.
Another flaw of current models is their assumption that radicalisation unfolds in neat, linear stages. In practice, the process is dynamic: individuals may enter radicalisation through multiple cognitive entry points, withdraw temporarily or oscillate between states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Some may escalate quickly after exposure to a single grievance while others move slowly over years.
What this means is that linear stage models are operationally useless. They provide no guidance to practitioners trying to intervene in real time because they cannot capture the back-and-forth nature of human psychology. What is needed is a Cognitive Dynamic Process Model one that maps radicalisation as a shifting system with multiple possible entry and exit points.
The Overlooked Role of External Messages
Another critical gap lies in how institutions treat extremist content. Too often, focus is placed only on the ideology itself whether it is far-right nationalism, Islamist radicalism or neo-Nazism without paying enough attention to the channels of transmission. Online forums, encrypted apps or even physical pamphlets serve as the mechanisms of dissemination that shape how vulnerable minds absorb hate.
In the Oslo case, investigations revealed that the suspect had been active on Telegram channels linked to far-right groups sharing anti-immigrant rhetoric. What was missing was a structured way to map these “message exposures” and their psychological impact. Without such mapping, a rehabilitation centre cannot distinguish between harmless browsing and immersion in a closed loop of extremist propaganda.
Rational Repair Before Emotional Regulation
Another lesson from radicalisation studies is that emotions are not the root of extremism but the symptoms of distorted reasoning. A young man who feels constant anger at immigrants or despair about his own future is usually reacting to underlying cognitive distortions selective perception, confirmation bias or absolutist judgments. Addressing only the emotional surface through anger management or therapy leaves the deeper mechanism untouched.
Interventions should therefore begin with cognitive recalibration: questioning assumptions, testing alternative interpretations and breaking down rigid “us versus them” worldviews. Only once this rational foundation is repaired can emotional regulation take hold. In practical terms, this means embedding critical-thinking sessions and structured cognitive exercises into rehabilitation programs rather than relying solely on counselling.
Emotions such as anger, despair or hopelessness are often treated as the drivers of radicalisation. In reality, they are the consequences of distorted reasoning. Without repairing the underlying rational functions, emotional interventions remain superficial. Cognitive recalibration teaching individuals to question assumptions, resist confirmation bias and consider alternative explanations is the necessary first step in preventing ideological entrenchment.
Behavioural Red Flags and the Need for Escalation Paths
At the same time, behavioural changes must not be ignored. The case studies highlights a progression from subtle withdrawal to secrecy, recruitment attempt, or even loyalty-proving violence. These indicators should be organised into a tiered escalation matrix. For example, minor withdrawal might trigger closer supervision, while any act of testing law-enforcement boundaries should demand immediate multi-agency coordination.
Such an approach would allow staff at welfare centres to respond proportionately without underestimating small signals or overreacting to every fluctuation. It also transforms radicalisation from a vague fear into a structured set of risk trajectories.
Behavioural progression from subtle withdrawal to recruitment attempts or loyalty-proving violence remains critical. What is missing is a tiered escalation system that tells practitioners how to act at each stage. Without it, staff may either underreact to early signs or overreact to minor fluctuations further alienating those they seek to help.
Special Risks in Closed Settings
Rehabilitation centres and prisons face unique challenges. They can become breeding grounds for extremist networks where radicalised individuals mentor others, smuggle in propaganda or demand loyalty through violent acts. The Oslo killing illustrates how even within a facility designed for care and rehabilitation an extremist mind set can fester unchecked.
To address this, institutions must conduct regular unit-level audits, scanning for coded communication, factional behaviour and hidden alliances. Staff must be trained to identify
“proof-of-loyalty” violence where individuals commit acts of aggression to demonstrate their allegiance to a cause as acute risk triggers. Release and post-discharge should be treated as high-risk transition points where external extremist networks may attempt to reclaim vulnerable individuals.
Rehabilitation centres and prisons are not immune. They can function as micro-ecosystems of radicalisation where extremist narratives spread quickly and violence is used to prove loyalty. Here, structured audits, coded-language monitoring and careful post-release planning are indispensable.
The Hybrid Challenge: Ideology and Mental Health
Another gap often overlooked is the intersection between ideology and mental illness. Some individuals are radicalised purely by ideology, others suffer from psychiatric disorders and some embody a hybrid case where mental illness amplifies extremist tendencies. Without a dual-track assessment institutions risk misclassifying individuals and applying the wrong interventions.
The solution is simple but profound: every assessment must check both ideological indicators and clinical markers. If both are present, the case should be treated as a “gearing effect” where the two factors reinforce one another requiring a combined treatment plan of security monitoring and psychiatric care.
Some cases are ideological, others psychiatric, but many are hybrids where mental illness amplifies extremist thinking. Without a dual-track system, interventions risk being misdirected. Addressing both simultaneously is essential to break the feedback loop between vulnerability and ideology.
The Gap in Academic Courses on Radicalisation and Extremism
Norway’s academic institutions are blessed with dedicated and hardworking professors who have contributed immensely to the growth of radicalisation and extremism studies. Their efforts in teaching foundational concepts, root causes and case studies of radicalised mind-sets provide students with a solid introduction and a strong theoretical foundation. This is essential for building early academic understanding and preparing students for careers in related fields. However, when we evaluate the real-world operational challenges of extremism and radicalisation, the current approach reveals a clear limitation. The syllabi and teaching methods remain largely unidirectional focused on conceptual theories, descriptive root causes and isolated case analyses. While valuable, this framework does not adequately capture the diversity and complexity of the driver variables that shape radicalisation processes in practice.
As a result, graduates trained solely in conceptual and qualitative paradigms are often left with limited operational tools to address extremism in the field. The absence of practical methodologies, systematic mapping of drivers and data-driven validation of indicators means that solutions proposed within such frameworks risk being random, inconsistent and lacking scientific rigour.
Therefore, there is a pressing need to upgrade the content of academic courses in radicalisation and extremism studies. The goal should be to bridge the gap between conceptual, qualitative knowledge and quantitative operationally relevant knowledge. By introducing frameworks from administrative criminology and equipping students with measurement tools, empirical methodologies and systematic models universities can ensure that learning translates directly into effective practice for institutions, policymakers and first-line practitioners.
Such an upgrade would not only enrich the academic experience but also ensure that Norway’s future experts in counter-radicalisation are prepared to contribute meaningfully to real-world prevention, intervention and resilience-building efforts.
Toward a Quantifiable Backbone
A final weakness lies in the absence of a common quantitative framework across agencies. Each institution whether police, welfare services or mental health often operates with its own indicators and methods. The result is fragmentation with no shared baseline for risk.
Here, the Equation of Radicalisation provides a way forward. By modelling radicalisation as the interplay of external pressures (E) and internal resilience (I) over time, it offers a backbone that can be applied consistently. Tracking whether E outweighs I and whether the net trajectory is rising or falling, would allow institutions to anticipate danger before it manifests in violence.
Designing Exits, Not Just Detecting Entries
The Oslo case shows how much energy is spent on spotting danger and how little on designing safe exits. Yet research demonstrates that radicalisation is reversible if individuals encounter well-timed interventions: a reconnection with non-radical peers, a return to education or employment or guidance from a credible mentor. These micro-exits need to be deliberately built into rehabilitation systems rather than left to chance.
Every case file should therefore include at least one potential exit pathway, reviewed and tested regularly. In many instances, these small nudges can be enough to weaken the grip of extremist thinking and redirect individuals toward constructive engagement.
Gap: Random and Copy-Paste Methods
One major weakness in today’s counter-radicalisation landscape is that existing methods are often based on observation, intuition, experiences or borrowed templates rather than systematic knowledge. Strategies are too often imported wholesale from other contexts, copied between agencies or built on the personal experience of individual practitioners. While these ad hoc approaches may work in isolated cases, they lack operational value when applied broadly.
To move forward, Norway must educate and train frontline practitioners in knowledge-based, scientifically grounded approaches. Only by equipping staff with a standardised toolkit of concepts, indicators and process models can the response become consistent, reliable and truly preventive.
Gap: Expert Confusion and the Lack of a Common Standard
Ask ten experts to describe the radicalisation process and you will receive ten different answers. This lack of consensus reveals a deeper problem: the knowledge bank among experts is fragmented and no standard framework exists to guide practitioners. The result is confusion at best and inconsistency at worst. One professional may describe radicalisation as ideological indoctrination another as identity crisis and a third as emotional dysregulation. While each view has merit, the absence of a shared understanding undermines efforts to detect and intervene early.
A dynamic process model would not only aid practitioners but also harmonise expert knowledge replacing scattered interpretations with a structured evidence-based standard.
Gap: Limited Number of Indicators
Current counter-radicalisation models also suffer from a poverty of indicators. Most published frameworks identify only a handful perhaps 30 or 45 signs of concern. But the process of radicalisation is far more complex and multifaceted. Cognitive, emotional, behavioural and environmental indicators can number in the hundreds, ranging from subtle distortions of reasoning to overt acts of testing authority.
With only a few indicators at their disposal practitioners are left to rely on random experience: one case might confirm their suspicions, while the next case, presenting differently slips past unnoticed. Expanding the bank of indicators to encompass the full spectrum of radicalisation dynamics is essential for clarity and consistency.
Gap: No Mechanism to Confirm Originality of Indicators
Even when indicators are observed practitioners face another difficulty: how to confirm whether a given signal is a genuine sign of radicalisation or a false alarm. No model currently allows experts to confirm the originality of each indicator within a broader process framework. This absence of verification leads to inconsistent judgments one expert may flag a behaviour as extremist while another dismisses it as harmless adolescent rebellion.
A robust process model would serve as a filter, confirming whether indicators truly align with radicalisation dynamics thus improving accuracy and reducing both false positives and missed warnings.
Toward Knowledge-Based, Scientific Counter-Radicalisation
The cumulative picture is clear: current counter-radicalisation practices are fragmented, linear and shallow. They rely too much on observation and intuition, too little on science and structure. They offer too few indicators, no shared process model and no mechanism to verify the originality of warning signs.
Moving forward requires a paradigm shift: from random, copy-paste methods to knowledgebased, systematic and dynamic approaches. Norway and indeed the wider world must invest in training frontline practitioners, developing cognitive dynamic process models, expanding indicator banks and building mechanisms of verification. Only then can interventions be consistent, operational and effective.
Conclusion: From Tragedy to Reform
The murder of Tamima Nibras Juhar stands as a devastating reminder of what happens when early warning signs are missed. It highlights systemic gaps: the failure to capture early cognitive shifts, the reliance on static risk models, the neglect of online messaging environments and the absence of unified frameworks across agencies.
But it also offers a chance for reform. Norway can build on existing research to design dynamic, preventive and compassionate systems, ones that identify radicalisation earlier, respond proportionately and create structured exit opportunities.
Tamima’s life was dedicated to supporting vulnerable young people. To honour her legacy, Norway must ensure that those who follow in her footsteps are better equipped, better protected and never again left to face the consequences of radicalisation alone.
The murder of Tamima Juhar shows what is at stake. She died while embodying the very values care, empathy, inclusion that radical ideologies seek to destroy. Preventing future tragedies means closing the gaps that have plagued counter-radicalisation for decades.
To honour her memory, Norway must not settle for outdated, linear and random methods. It must lead in building a scientific, systematic and dynamic framework that captures the true complexity of radicalisation, equips practitioners with real operational tools and transforms early identification from a guessing game into a reliable defence of democracy and human life.
