Dark Signals: How Western Technology Drives Pakistan’s Terror Surge and the Need for Control
For over two decades, Pakistan has grappled with the immense challenge of terrorism. Numerous insurgent and terrorist groups operate across the country. While their exact number is uncertain, groups in the north, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Balochistan, often align with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In Balochistan, others operate under the umbrella of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The TTP was formed in 2007, primarily against Pakistan Army’s entry into Tribal areas and Pakistan’s decision to side with U.S. and its Western allies against the Afghanistan. Similarly, the BLA was formed in early 2000, with initial focus on demanding rightful share of province’s resources for its people through political struggle, but later resorted to armed rebellion, struggling for complete independence. Incontrovertible evidence shows that both the TTP and the BLA receive active support from foreign powers. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, both groups have staged a deadly resurgence.
These groups have been observed using advanced weapons, modern night vision devices, and sophisticated communication systems abandoned by U.S. forces after their withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. These tools have significantly enhanced their operational capabilities, allowing them to conduct attacks with greater precision and coordination. Most critically, they have adopted cutting-edge technologies, including satellite-based internet, smartphones, and social media platforms, to strengthen their networks and expand their influence. Through satellite internet and mobile phones, these groups maintain secure and rapid communication across remote and rugged terrains, where traditional systems often fail. They use encrypted messaging apps and coded language to coordinate operations, share intelligence, and evade detection by authorities. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (Twitter), Telegram, and others, have become powerful communication tools for these groups. They post propaganda, including videos and statements, to recruit new members, spread fear, and claim responsibility for attacks. These posts often disguise their messages in subtle or symbolic language to avoid scrutiny while reaching a wide audience. Additionally, they issue press releases and updates to publicize their activities, portraying their actions as victories to gain support and legitimacy among the masses. This strategic use of technology and social media has made groups like the TTP and the BLA more resistant and dangerous. By leveraging these modern tools, they not only communicate internally but also project their influence globally, challenging Pakistan’s efforts to counter their activities.
Pakistan’s digital landscape, a lifeline for 118 million internet users (54% of the population), is powered by technology that lies beyond its control. The nation’s internet and cellular networks rely heavily on infrastructure from U.S. and European companies, from submarine cables spanning oceans, to satellite systems and mobile equipment driving 4G and nascent 5G connectivity. This dependency, while enabling Pakistan’s digital growth, creates a glaring vulnerability: the government lacks robust mechanisms to monitor or regulate these foreign-controlled systems. Terrorist groups like the TTP and BLA exploit this gap, wielding advanced communication tools to orchestrate attacks, share intelligence, and evade capture with alarming precision. As Pakistan struggles with a resurgent terror threat, this digital dilemma demands urgent action to reclaim sovereignty over its communication networks.
The Foreign Tech Backbone Pakistan’s internet flows through eight active submarine fiber-optic cables, covering thousands of kilometers and landing primarily in Karachi and Gwadar. These include Sea-Me-We 4 (SMW-4), Sea-Me-We 5 (SMW-5), IMEWE, Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), Transworld 1 (TW1), PEACE Cable, and others, with Africa-1 and 2Africa expected to activate by 2026, boosting capacity to over 26 Tbps. Satellite systems, such as U.S.-based Iridium and Europe’s Inmarsat, complement these cables, providing internet and voice services in remote areas where terrestrial networks falter. Cellular infrastructure—powered by Nokia, Ericsson, and Qualcomm – relies on foreign hardware and software, with core data often hosted on overseas servers. This setup, managed by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) and Transworld Associates (TWA), delivers connectivity but leaves the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) with limited oversight over encryption protocols and data flows. Encrypted apps like Telegram and Signal, and social media platforms like Meta’s Facebook and X, operate on foreign servers, rendering local interception nearly impossible.
Terrorists’ Digital Arsenal: For the TTP and BLA, this foreign tech is a force multiplier. Operating in the rugged terrains of KP and Balochistan, where traditional networks are unreliable, these groups exploit satellite internet and mobile systems to devastating effect. Satellite phones, unhindered by local blackouts, enable secure, real-time coordination inside and across borders. A September 10, 2025, Khabar Kada, a digital news portal tracking Pakistan’s security developments, revealed: “The operational capacities of these groups have been reinforced by foreign actors and the Afghan Taliban. Authorities also point to a strong nexus between India and the BLA, with alleged support and coordination through handlers in Afghanistan via satellite phones”. Encrypted messaging apps allow militants to share attack plans and intelligence with coded precision, while social media amplifies their reach. Propaganda videos, veiled manifestos, and recruitment posts flood platforms, often dodging detection through symbolic language. In 2024, the PTA suspended 500 such accounts, but new ones emerge rapidly, hosted beyond Pakistan’s reach. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, both groups have leveraged abandoned U.S. tech – night-vision goggles, radios, and more – alongside digital tools, making them more lethal than ever.
The High Cost of Dependency: The government’s primary countermeasure – internet and mobile shutdowns – is a blunt and costly weapon. Localized or nationwide blackouts, often triggered by security threats, disrupt militant communications but devastate the economy. Pakistan’s IT sector, generating $3.5 billion annually in exports, loses an estimated $1-2 million daily during outages. E-commerce platforms like Daraz, freelancers on Upwork, and local businesses grind to a halt, while foreign clients – frustrated by unreliability – cancel contracts, redirecting work to competitors like India. A recent submarine cable fault near Jeddah on September 6, 2025, slowed speeds nationwide, with repairs expected to take weeks, highlighting the fragility of Pakistan’s connectivity. Shutdowns also fail to fully neutralize terrorists. Satellite internet bypasses terrestrial blackouts, keeping militant channels open while civilians suffer. The absence of local data centers or sovereign cloud infrastructure means Pakistan cannot cache critical services domestically, amplifying both security and economic risks.
The Chinese Model
A tailored adaptation of China’s “internet sovereignty” framework, first outlined in a 2010 white paper by the Chinese government, could help Pakistan curb online radicalization while maintaining digital access for its citizens, according to a recent analysis (Chinese Government, 2010).
China’s internet governance model, underpinned by the “Great Firewall” has been a cornerstone of its digital strategy since the mid-2000s. The system, formally known as the Golden Shield Project, employs advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics to monitor and censor online content. By 2008, the project evolved into Golden Shield Phase II, incorporating cutting-edge tools to block access to undesirable websites through methods like bandwidth throttling, keyword filtering, and Deep Packet Inspection, as reported by Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.). This infrastructure has enabled China to create a tightly controlled intranet, isolating over a billion daily users from the global internet while providing robust platforms for communication, entertainment, and commerce.
Pakistan could temporarily adopt elements of this model to counter TTP and BLA propaganda, particularly in volatile regions like Balochistan and KP. For instance, China’s AI-driven content monitoring has proven effective, blocking 70% of extremist content in Xinjiang, according to counterterrorism studies (Counterterrorism Analysis, 2024). A similar approach could be implemented by Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which in 2024 suspended 500 social media accounts on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, X, and Telegram for spreading extremist material (FIA Report, 2024). By deploying AI to flag and remove propaganda, Pakistan could enhance its digital defenses.
China’s model also includes stringent cybersecurity regulations, introduced in 2015, which mandate technology firms (local and foreign) to submit source code and adopt Chinese encryption algorithms (Chinese Government, 2015). Pakistan could emulate this by empowering the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) to require U.S. and European tech providers to store data locally or provide access to encryption keys. This would mirror China’s crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs) in 2015, which limited access to foreign sites like Google and Facebook, forcing users onto domestic platforms (Reporters Without Borders, 2015).
To maintain civilian access in high-risk areas, Pakistan could establish community Wi-Fi hubs while restricting encrypted platforms, a strategy aligned with China’s approach in Xinjiang. Collaboration with China, a key ally through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), could further bolster these efforts. Chinese tech giants like Huawei and Galaxy Space could support local infrastructure development, while joint counter-terrorism tech initiatives could enhance oversight,.
However, Pakistan must also diversify its digital infrastructure to reduce vulnerabilities. The upcoming Africa-1 and 2Africa submarine cables, set to deliver 180 Tbps capacity by 2026, offer an opportunity to break the duopoly of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) and Transworld Associates (TWA) by encouraging private investment from firms like Cybernet (Africa-1 Consortium, 2025). Additionally, investing in SUPARCO’s satellite capabilities could strengthen Pakistan’s digital resilience.
Invest in Indigenous Infrastructure
The Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is poised to strengthen Pakistan’s digital infrastructure through its PakSat-MM1 satellite, launched on May 30, 2024, which delivers high-speed broadband to remote and underserved regions (Paksat International, 2024). By expanding PakSat-MM1’s capabilities to compete with foreign satellite providers, Pakistan could limit militants’ access to external communication networks while ensuring reliable internet for civilians. Developing domestic data centers and localized platforms would further reduce dependence on foreign servers, enhancing data security and sovereignty. To counter extremist activities in volatile areas, SUPARCO should prioritize providing secure satellite communication and internet services, while implementing measures to disrupt unauthorized foreign satellite access, thereby safeguarding national security and fostering digital resilience.
Key features of PakSat-MM1 include: PakSat-MM1, a High Throughput Satellite (HTS) utilizing Ka-band technology, is revolutionizing broadband connectivity across Pakistan with commercial services starting August 14, 2024, offering up to 10 Gbps capacity and 160 Mbps download speeds (Paksat International, 2024). With advanced features like portable 0.98m user terminals, low power consumption of 60W, and efficient bandwidth reuse through multiple beams, PakSat-MM1 ensures seamless, cost-effective, and high-speed internet access, even in remote areas, bridging the digital divide for businesses, educational institutions, government projects, and individuals while driving innovation in Pakistan’s digital landscape.
In times of crisis, extraordinary measures are imperative. The sophisticated use of advanced communication technologies, social media platforms, and satellite systems by terrorists has inflicted profound losses on Pakistan, both in terms of human lives and economic resources. The nation’s increasing reliance on western digital infrastructure is a double-edged sword: while it connects millions and drives progress, it also empowers terrorists who exploit foreign technologies to orchestrate attacks and spread propaganda. Internet shutdowns, though implemented to curb these threats, disrupt the economy and have proven insufficient in neutralizing the danger. To safeguard its future, Pakistan must act decisively by implementing smarter regulations, fostering strategic international partnerships, and investing in resilient digital infrastructure. Without such proactive measures, the country risks ceding control of its digital landscape, jeopardizing both national security and economic stability.
